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ABSTRACT 
Robotic spacecraft are controlled by sets of commands 
called “sequences.” These sequences must be checked 
against mission constraints. Making our existing 
constraint checking program faster would enable new 
capabilities in our uplink process. Therefore, we are 
rewriting this program to run on a parallel computer. 
To do so, we had to determine how to run constraint- 
checking algorithms in parallel and create a new 
method of specifying spacecraft models and 
constraints. This new specification gives us a means 
of representing flight systems and their predicted 
response to commands which could be used in a 
variety of applications throughout the command 
process, particularly during anomaly or high-activity 
operations. This commonality could reduce operations 
cost and risk for future complex missions. Lessons 
learned in applying some parts of this system for the 
TOPEXPoseidon mission will be described. 
Key Words: Sequencing, mission operations, 
automation, parallel computing. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Robotic spacecraft are controlled by sets of time- 
tagged onboard commands called ‘‘sequences.” These 
sequences must be verified and checked against 
mission constraints to be certain that they will have 
the planned effect on the spacecraft. One of the key 
automated portions of the sequence verification 
process is a checking program which does some 
limited functional simulation of the sequence running 
on the spacecraft and compares the resulting spacecraft 
states against mission rules. Constraint-checking 
occurs at many points in the so-called “uplink 
process”, which creates spacecraft command 
sequences. Checking occurs at the command timing 
interaction level, but also at the high-level planning 
and sequence-integration stages. 
Making our existing sequencechecking program, 
(called the “Checker”) faster would make some 
changes in our uplink process, since then people 
building command sequences would not tend to check 
a sequence by hand before submitting it to lengthy 
batch runs. We determined that a good way to make 
the Checker code run faster would be to run it on a 
parallel computer, which meant that we had to 
determine how to run constraintchecking algorithms 
in parallel. Directly porting the existing Checker 
code to a parallel machine, however, proved to be 
difficult due to the inherently non-parallel way in 
which the flight rules and the spacecraft models on 
which they acted were encoded pefs 1-2.1 Once we 
realized this, we concentrated our efforts on exploring 
better ways of specifying constraints and models. 
When we created this new specification system, we 
realized that we had a way of describing flight 
systems that was more broadly applicable than just 
within the traditional “sequence checking” part of the 
flight command process. A general representation of 
flight systems and their predicted response to 
commands could be used in a variety of applications 
throughout the uplink process, particularly during 
anomaly or high-activity operations. We currently 
have two development efforrs under way: a system 
intended to run on a parallel computer, and an 
operational (sequential) system for use by the 
TOPEX/Poseidon spacecraft. 
2. SPECIFICATION AND VERIFICATION 
2.1. Basics 
We describe spacecraft systems in terms of three 
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fundamental pieces: the rules to be checked, a model 
of the subsystem(s) of the spacecraft or ground 
system to which the rule(s) apply, and an “action 
table” that describes interactions among the models 
and illegal transitions inside the models [Ref. 31. It 
is also very desirable to have “status events” that flag, 
in user-readable form, changes of state of some 
spacecraft components. Each of these is now described 
in turn. 
2.2 Rules 
When a spacecraft is designed, “flight rules” or 
“mission rules” are developed to prevent damage to 
the hardware, to prevent loss of science data, or to 
simplify and constrain the operation of the spacecraft. 
In our system, which we call SAVE (Specification 
and Verification Environment) each rule to be checked 
by software is expressed as a logical constraint over 
state transitions. The constraint can be of temporal 
nature as well as a constraint over state orderings. 
Informally, the syntax of a rule is as follows. 
Whenever (astate -> a certain value) 
i f  (some condition holds ) 
=>(a violation of the flight rule has 
occurred). 
Where the “->” symbol should be read as “goes to” 
and the “=>” value should be read as “generates.” The 
states and models used in the rules are defined in 
models and action tables. 
2.3 States 
The states may be in the format 
model.state 
where model is the name of the model to which the 
state belongs, and state  is the particular state 
variable. For temporal comparisons, the state may 
also be shown as: . 
model.state.time 
where the t ime  field is the time at which a given 
state achieved its most recent value. The syntax used 
inside the “iY clauses of the rules is the standard 
syntax for a logical expression in the “C” 
programming language; e.g. “&&” for “AND, “II” 
for “OR, and so on. 
2.4. Status information 
It is desired that the status of certain variables be 
printed out whenever the state changes (even if the 
change is not a flight rule violation.) The synw for 
status events is similar to that for rules, namely: 
henever (state-a goes to a value) 
then status (state-astate-bstate-c ....) 
if ( condition) 
where state-a is the “trigger state” which will cause a 
status message to be generated, and state-b, stafe-c, 
. . . are states the user may want to see as well when 
state-a changes. Usually the condition in the “if” 
statement will be TRUE unconditionally -- that is, 
the status event will always be printed out 
irrespective of any other states. 
2.5 Models 
Every rule and status event requires that one or more 
“models” of a limited subset of the spacecraft 
behavior be generated. These models can be shown in 
“finite-state” form: that is, a portion of the spacecraft 
is modeled in terms of several discrete variables (an 
“A” and “B” redundant side, for example). The 
commands or other actions that cause the system to 
transition from one state to another are shown on the 
arcs between the commands. [Figure 11. 
STATES: 
1NSTRUMENT.POWER = (A, B, NONE) 
1NSTRUMENT.MODE = (OFF, POWERED, ON) 
In model, stale k shown as (POWER, MODE) 
Number in brackets kstale number (seeaction table) 
I 
Figure I .  A typical state diagram. 
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Figure 1 models an instrument on board a spacecraft 
which can be powered by one of two redundant power 
supplies - A or B. The command to close the relays 
from &he instrument to the A power supply is the 
“AJ’OWER-ON command; similarly with the 
“B-POWER-ON” command. Once the instrument is 
powered, it can be turned on to its operational mode 
with the “INSTRUMENT-ON command. This 
model shows that the instrument can be turned 
on when it is unpowered, but it will then surge when 
power is applied ”his “illegal transition” is discussed 
in the following sxtion. 
2.6 Action tables 
The finite-state models can also be shown more 
completely in a spreadsheet-like form. This form has 
all the legal states in the vertical direction, and all the 
transition commands in the horizontal direction 
Every command is analyzed for its actions should it 
be issued in any of the states. In some cases this will 
work out to nothing happening; in others this 
command will cause an illegal transition. These 
illegal transitions will also be flagged by the 
checking software if and when they occur. The “next 
state” field in each box of the action table tells the 
software fhat the next state would be should the 
relevant ~ ~ m m a n d  be issued. 
Figure 2 shows an “action table” for the system 
shown in Figure 1. The blank boxes in the Action 
rows imply that the transition simply takes place to 
the “Next State” shown and no side effects occur. 
The “ERROR” states shown (for example, the 
transition from State 0 to State 3 caused by the 
INSTRUMENT-ON command issued when the 
spacecraft is in State 0) would generate an “illegal 
transition” message to the user. Arbitrarily complex 
“side effects” (e.g., effects on other models) can 
appear in these “action” boxes in the form of function 
calls in the “C” programming language. 
Let’s say that there is a restriction on the system 
shown in Figures 1 and 2 that will not allow other 
instruments to be turned on if this instrument 
happens to be turned on. A typical rule, then, for the 
system described in Figure 1 might then be expressed 
as: 
Whenever (INSTRUMENTMODE -> ON) 
i f  (OTHER-INSTRUMENTMODE == ON) 
=> violation. 
Note that there is no hard-and-fast distinction between 
an “illegal transition” and a “flight rule”; some illegal 
transitions have been called out as particularly 
troublesome and made rules. Implementationally, 
some are easier to call out one way and some in 
others. 
3.0 PARALLEL IMPLEMENTAnON 
3.1. Overview 
Our next step was to build a small prototype system 
that used these principles and implemented them on a 
parallel computer. This SAVE software 
implementation consists of two major functions. 
The primary function is sequence verification; the 
second (related) function is system specification. 
System specification is a kind of “installation” 
function which normally would not be used routinely. 
In system specification, an operator using finite state 
machine notation lays out a spacecraft/ground model, 
and specifies constraints upon the behavior of this 
model. System verification is “production” running 
of the system to check a sequence with pre-defined 
constraints. 
The system was designed in three basic parts: the 
“core”, the “compiler” and the “database.” Figure 31. 
The compiler takes as input rules in the “whenever” 
syntax described above, and models in a database. 
Figure 2. An Action Table. 
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format derived from the action table format shown in 
Figure 2. When a user adds a model or rule, these 
inputs are compiled into in-line C code, which is 
linked with the core code. 
and an error message, if any, is output to the error 
log. A final state is written to a file at the end of the 
run. 
3.3. Parallel processing results 
3.2. Runtime environment 
At runtime, the core code determines from a user 
input how many processors and models it will have 
for the gwen run. It assigns the models to processors 
according to a user-specified definition. A sequence 
of commands to be checked against rules is read and 
stripped of all information that is not relevant to the 
sequence rule checking function. The commands in 
the sequence are then partitioned out to the different 





“C” language code - I ]  I 
“C“ compiler ClUNIX 
linker I 
‘ 1  VERIFICATION ENVIRONMENT 
Initial conditions 
Figure 3. Architecture summary. 
Then, starting from an initial state for each model, 
each command‘s effects on the system are simulated 
according to the data in the action tables. If a state 
changes that triggers a rule check, the rule is activated 
A prototype was built on a five-processor parallel 
computer. In this prototype, a “conservative” 
synchronization approach pef.41 is used to ensure 
that processors do not get out of synchronization with 
each other. This prototype showed that this 
methodology could achieve excellent speedup for this 
type of problem depending heavily upon the actual 
models and sequences being checked. (Models which 
interact with each other frequently make less efficient 
use of the parallel computer. Sequences which use one 
model disproportionately make less efficient use, as 
do very short sequences where work tends not to 
average out over the parallel processor too well.) 
The methods used in the parallel prototype could 
easily be adapted to a distributed system or to any of a 
variety of parallel architectures. The system is best 
suited for the type of parallel processor which has 
substantial memory and processing power on each 
node (i.e., a “large g r a i n s  or “medium grained” 
machine). We also use this parallel system as the 
basis for our one-processor system we are 
implementing for the TOPEXPoseidon project. For 
the one-processor version, we have built routines that 
mimic the parallel interprocessor communications and 
return the same value(s) as would the parallel one. 
Since most of these routines do nothing on one 
processor, this was not a complex task. 
4.0 LESSONS LEARNED FROM EIGHT 
IMPLEMENTATION 
4.1. Moving a prototype into a flight environment 
Recently it was decided to build a sequencechecking 
system for the TOPEXPoseidon spacecraft based on 
the SAVE prototype system. This full system is 
called “MSAVE (for Mission Planning, Sequencing 
and Scheduling Specification and Verification 
Environment) Several modifications were necessary 
to the system for it to be used in the TOPEX 
environment [RefS]. 
4.2. Modifications required 
These modifications fell into three basic categories. 
First, some additional functionality in the core code 
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was needed to handle TOPEX-specific issues (TOPEX 
file formats, handling of some special command 
types, etc). Secondly, a more robust and friendlier 
user interface was needed than the text-editor- 
dependent interface of the prototype. A graphical user 
interface based on X-windows is being developed, 
heavily re-using code that was developed for the rest 
of the TOPEX sequencing system. Thirdly, some 
convenience functions to assist people developing 
large sequences were added. 
One of these “conveniences” was the addition of 
“intermediate carryover.” It is always necessary to 
carry over state information from the end of one 
sequence to the beginning of the next. Intermediate 
carryover, however, is used to allow MSAVE to start 
a run part-way into a sequence file, similar to the 
concept of “checkpointing” often used in large 
computational physics runs. If an anomaly occurs on 
the spacecraft, this capability can also be used to 
allow the user to change a state at a given time 
without a command (should the spacecraft exercise 
some of its automated fault protection, for example.) 
This same capability could also be used for “what-if‘ 
tests: if a sequence is built and someone in real time 
wants to know “what happens if I turned off this 
piece of hardware here with a realtime command’? 
limited and predefined. Further, rules and models are 
isolated from the rest of the processing code, and a 
tracking scheme to avoid the possibility of 
overwriting variables or addresses in the rest of the 
executable has been developed. A syntax and f m a t  
checking process takes place in MSAVE when a 
compilation request for a new rule or model is 
received to enforce this isolation. These limitations 
should bound the amount of testing that will be 
required. 
A good analogy to the MSAVE testing situation is 
that when one develops flight code in C it is not seen 
as necessary to re-regression-test the C compiler for 
every delivery of the C software in addition to testing 
the code that has been written. The specification 
environment portion of MSAVE can be seen as a 
compiler for the flight rule and model language, and 
as such can be tested once and then the ”programs” 
(the new rules and models as they are added) can be 
debugged separately. However, there is a capability in 
MSAVE to add functions in action tables for complex 
side-effect calculations. These functions will need to 
be generated in an editor, and limited functional 
testing of the system will be performed should a 
function like this be linked into MSAVE. 
4.4. Limitations of the Verification Environment 
4.3. Testing issues 
In addition, several issues arose that were not as 
critical in the research prototyping environment. 
Primarily these issues were in the realm of 
compatibility with existing software, testing and 
verification. The most significant of these was that 
the MSAVE system is novel among flight sequence 
checking software in that it allows a user to compile 
new rules and models into in-line code, thereby 
reducing the coding complexity and runtime penalties 
inherent in interpreted code while avoiding the 
inflexibility of hardcoded models. When a rule or 
model is added and saved, MSAVE will automatically 
recompile and relink the relevant MSAVE 
executables. However, the following issue inevitably 
arises: 
“When we add a rule or m d e l  and add it to 
the code and recompile, what retesting is 
necessary ?” 
The addition of a rule or model is generating code, but 
the code is machine-generated. This machine- 
generation process will be exhaustively tested prior to 
project delivery. The syntax of the code is also 
MSAVE will not be able to detect constraint 
violations which occur after the end of a sequence, 
although if a subsequent sequence is checked they will 
be detected at that time. MSAVE verifies constraints 
using information available in the command sequence 
file only. This implies that certain constraints, such 
as those requiring precision modeling of spacecraft 
turns, solar array slewing, or orbit position 
propagation cannot be verified without significantly 
expanding the complexity and scope of rules and 
models in this implementation of MSAVE (although 
the general SAVE methodology in Section 2 could 
support this functionality). 
4.5. Limitations of the Specification Environment 
4.5.1. Command Scheduling And Cyclic Graphs 
Sometimes it arises that a command has an effect 
later in time than the command itself; for example, a 
heater takes a thruster to the “warm” state after some 
time delay. These effects are modeled by “scheduling” 
a pseudocommand at a later (or, in some cases, the 
same) time. This ability to schedule commands is 
also the essential mechanism by which a given model 
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can effect changes upon the state of another model. 
The danger arises from self-scheduling commands, 
which can lead to a cyclic graph; i.e., Command A 
which schedules Command B which schedules 
Command A which .... whenever Command A or B 
is in the sequence file. This problem is handled in 
the flight version by prohibiting these loops, but a 
robust way of handling this situation is of interest for 
future versions. 
4.5.2. Model Modification And Consistency 
Maintenance 
The user will load into memory and edit only one 
model at any given time. Inconsistencies can arise 
because of this; for example, if Model B reads a state 
variable of Model A, and the user decides to delete 
this state variable in Model A, then Model B now has 
a reference to an undefined state variable. When the 
models are compiled, the inconsistency is detected 
and an error generated. It would be preferable to catch 
the error as soon as possible, but if MSAVE tried to 
catch all inconsistencies as each change to a model 
was entered, its performance would probably be 
unacceptable to the user if there were more than a few 
models in the system. 
available, we will take this large set and a set of 
sequences and determine the parallel efficiency of this 
full implementation. This will give us a basis for 
extrapolation for other missions and applications. 
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